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Abstract 
Employee`s information security behavior is critical to ensure the security of organization`s information 
assets. Countermeasures, such as information security policies, are helpful to reduce computer abuse 
and information systems misuse. However, employees in practice tend to engage in these violation 
behaviors, although they know policies and countermeasures. Undoubtedly, these omission behaviors 
will bring big loss or other potential risks to information assets security. The current study try to make 
clear on the influence factors of information security omission behaviors and how these drive factors 
work. From organization control perspective, we integrate deterrence theory and social norm theory to 
construct research model. We expect deterrence (as normal control) will effectively decrease omission 
behavioral intention. Besides, colleague`s security omission behaviors may mislead some employee`s 
behaviors more or less, which is easy to form error code of conduct and induce to the similar omission 
behaviors. To date, social norms of misperception (as informal control) has not been sufficiently 
concerned in IS security literature and we believe that may provide a new perceptive to understand the 
formation mechanism of security omission behaviors.  
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1    INTRODUCTION 
One of the big challenge for enterprises in information asserts management is try to avoid information 
security incidents in workplace. Surveys suggest that 25% of organizations suffer from the Internet 
abuse caused by employees, and 13% of organizations report the unauthorized access attempts sourced 
from insiders (Park et al. 2012). More increasing researchers and practitioners have reached a consensus 
that internal employees pose a major threat to IS security rather than external attacks (Guo et al. 2011; 
Warkentin & Willison 2009). In order to minimize security breaches, organizations pin their hopes on 
security education, training and awareness (SETA) programs and information security policies (ISPs) 
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Puhakainen & Siponen 2010; Whitman 2003). In practice, nearly 90% of large-
size enterprises and 67% of small-size enterprises in UK have established information security policies 
(Furnell & Rajendran 2012). These policies provide some standards to demarcate what behaviors are 
permitted or prohibited for employees in information security practice, as well as the consequent 
sanctions if the forbidden behaviors are happened. However, employees often use some tricks to 
rationalize their violation behaviors, such as neutralization techniques (Siponen & Vance 2010). Besides, 
employees` benefit-cost calculate or rational choice processes may also lead to the ineffectiveness of 
sanctions (Hu et al. 2011). Many employees in enterprises always “do not do what they are supposed to 
do” (Furnell & Rajendran 2012; Guo et al. 2011). When employees “who are aware of IS security threats 
and countermeasures but fail to implement those measures”, information security omission behavior 
will be happen, this phenomenon also be called as knowing-doing gap (Workman et al. 2008) .  
Assisting information security management practices to avoid these knowing-doing gap depends on the 
ability to determine why and how these omission behavior happened. Workman et al. (2008) construct 
a threat control model based on protection motivation theory to explain this knowing-doing gap. The 
model concerns personal response to fear appeals and social influences. Besides, Cox (2012) develops 
a model of knowing-doing gap based on the theory of planned behavior to examine the information 
assurance understanding and security awareness. The conclusion reveals that subjective norms play a 
significant role in understanding the omission behavior. Subjective norm captures one`s perception 
about “what those who are important think he should do in a given situation” (Bobek et al. 2013). As 
one of social norm constructs, subjective norm is promoting employee`s ISPs compliance and 
decreasing their misbehaviors (Al-Omari et al. 2012; Herath & Rao 2009; Hu et al. 2012). On the 
contrary, Dugo (2007) confirms the positive correlation relationship between employees` subject norm 
for committing an information security violation and their intention to commit violation. That reveals 
that incorrect norms may lead to deviation behaviors during employee`s organizational information 
security practices. Furthermore, both Li et al. (2010) and Zhang et al. (2009) conjecture the exists of 
incorrect norms (such as Internet abuse norms) and the negative impact on employees intention to 
information security policy compliance. Unquestionably, this incorrect norm is beyond the expectations 
of organization and must be avoided. 
The purpose of the current study is try to understand employee`s information security omission 
behaviors from organization control perspective. Research questions center on: 1) Recognizing the role 
of punishment with mandatoriness. Through neutralization techniques and rational calculate processes 
may cause the failure of deterrence, we still believe punishment is indispensable for reducing 
employee`s omission behaviors. 2) Exploring the role of social norms with misperception. Social norms 
theory states that personal behavior is impacted by some incorrect perceptions of how other social group 
members think and act (Berkowitz 2004). And these incorrect perceptions stem form misperception, 
namely, the gap between perceived norms and actual norms. However, these negative norms are little 
attracted in IS security researches. We believe social norm theory may provide a new perspective to 
understand the formation of the security omission behavior. 3) Excavating the potential relationships 
between these formal control (punishment) and informal control (social norms). We are interested in 
whether the punishment will go to ineffectiveness in this misperception norms context. We also 
interested in whether the punishment positively moderate the relationship between social norm of 
misperception and behavior intention. The conclusion will be provide an interesting perspective that 
counters deterrence theory. (4) Designing the effective intervention mechanism based on social norm 
approach, and then promoting employee`s actual compliance to ISPs.  
2    THEORY BACKGROUND 
2.1    Organization Control 
Control is defined as a process in which organizations of people affect what other people, group, or 
organization will do (Jaeger & Baliga 1985). From organizational information security perspective, 
control is a mandatory mechanism established to ensure employees` actions in line with an agreed-upon 
strategy and then achieve desired security goals. Two types of organization control mechanisms are 
concerned: formal control and information control (Narayanaswamy & Henry 2005; Nieminen & 
Lehtonen 2008). Formal control is a process of performance evaluation in organization, where the senior 
leaders (as the controllers) observe employees behaviors or states desired outcomes; while informal 
control focus more on social or people self-regulation (Kirsch 1997). At the formal control level, written 
documents in terms of rules, goals, procedures, and regulations are in place to specify desirable 
behaviors, while at the informal control level, organizational values, norms, and cultures are emphasized 
to influence compliance behaviors (Das & Teng 1998). In current study, we are interested in 
understanding whether security omission behavior will be affected by these control mechanisms and 
how they work. 
2.1.1    Formal Control: Punishment 
Deterrence is widely adopted in IS security literatures (D'Arcy et al. 2009; Kankanhalli et al. 2003; 
Straub Jr & Nance 1990), which consists of two dimensions: punishment certainty and punishment 
severity (Liao et al. 2009; Tittle 1980). Deterrence theory predicts violation or infringement behaviors 
can be controlled well through sanctions which are certainty and/or severity. Namely, people will 
abandon undesirable behaviors and turn to act recommendations when they believe the probability of 
capture is high (punishment certainty) and/or the power of penalty is strong (punishment severity). 
However, not all the researches recognize the effective of punishment (Hu et al. 2011; Pahnila et al. 
2007; Siponen & Vance 2010). Bulgurcu et al. (2010) believe that punishment is only a part of external 
motivation for users ISPs adherence behavior, intrinsic desires also play important roles simultaneously. 
Besides, Siponen and Vance (2010) find that neutralization technologies usage is an important factor to 
explain deterrence efforts failure in employee`s ISPs violation behaviors. Despite the inconsistent of 
research conclusions, deterrent theory still an effective and highly recognized criminal theory. Finding 
the reasons why deterrent security policies do not work is important (Guo et al. 2011). This study focus 
on the general deterrence theory and take punishment as critical measure in organization formal control. 
Formal control uses codified policies with mandatoriness, which including the explicit sanction, to 
guide and regulate employees behaviors (Liang et al. 2013).  
2.1.2    Informal Control: Social Norms 
Informal control (i.e. clan control) relates to social strategies to bridge gaps among peers and guide their 
behaviors into recommendations (Liang et al. 2013). In this paper, we focus on social norms, which can 
be viewed as standards of behaviors well acknowledged by employees in information security 
circumstance. Social norm is established based on normative beliefs, which promotes employee`s ISPs 
compliance behavior and against violation or abuse behaviors (Al-Omari et al. 2012; Herath & Rao 
2009; Hu et al. 2012). In these studies, social norms are defaulted as beliefs in accordance with 
organization expectations. However, Zhang et al. (2009) fail to confirm the analogous relationship 
between subjective norms (one construct of social norms) and intention to comply with policy. They 
give a potential reason that the effect of subjective norms are highly associated with personal experience, 
while the long-term accumulated ill beliefs may occupy the dominance and then lead employees to the 
contrary of recommendation behaviors. Not all the norms in organization are in line with organizational 
expectations, there exist quite a few of misperception norms which deviate from organizational 
identification. And the greater employees` subjective norm for committing information security 
violation behavior, the greater their intention to commit it (Dugo 2007). Yet, these norms are not taken 
too much consideration in prior studies. 
People are easily to feel cognitive pressures when their current behavior is different to peers or they 
engage in a dilemma to choose their actions. Just as the misperceptions of Internet abuse beliefs may 
be viewed as one kind of “common” norms accumulating and diffusing during a bit long period, which 
then are adopted and imitated by the majority. We believe this diffusion of misperceptions will cause 
the increase of information omission behaviors. And the social norms theory may provide an 
explanation on the misperception. 
2.2    Social Norms Theory 
Social norm is more related to the concept of peer influence, which refers to the pressure to perform or 
not perform a behavior that is determined by a person`s inclination to comply with people who are 
important to him or her (Lee & Larsen 2009). Social learning theory posits that people learn from one 
another via observation, imitation, and modeling. As a social being, what we have done is more or less 
effected by others or effecting others. However, people often confuse the boundaries between perceived 
norms (what we think peers believe and do) and actual norms (peers real beliefs and actions), which 
may cause the misperception (Berkowitz 2004). Actually, people exaggeratedly overestimate or 
drastically underestimate the effect of peer influence.  
Social norms theory captures people`s express or inhibit behavior to comply with a perceived norm 
(Berkowitz 2003), which states that people`s behavior is impacted by some incorrect perceptions of 
how other social group members think and act (Berkowitz 2004). Prior studies have been confirmed the 
empirical effectiveness of social norms theory in predicting and intervening health-risk behaviors 
(Berkowitz 2010; Berkowitz 2004; Perkins 2002). Berkowitz (2003) clarifies that the social norms 
theory is also suitable to issues without changes or adjustments under the conditions of identical 
etiology and dynamics of these issues, and extends this theory to explain social justice. Halbesleben et 
al. (2007) try to theorize pluralistic ignorance (one type of social norm of misperception) in organization 
contexts. In information security fields, pluralistic ignorance is adopted to predict employee`s Internet 
abuse and personal use of Internet and system monitoring (Kim et al. 2005; Lee et al. 2008).  
Two types of misperceptions are adopted to contribute to our research: pluralistic ignorance and false 
consensus. The former describes the majority who engage in health behavior may incorrectly believe 
they are in minority; and the latter captures the minority who engage in health-risk behavior may 
incorrectly deem they are in majority (Berkowitz 2004). Based on prior studies, people are easily engage 
in unhealthy behavior or risk behavior rather than healthy behavior when they exaggerate peers 
misconduct actions and/or underestimate their good practices. The current study tries to adopt social 
norms theory to explain the formation processes of employee`s information security omission behavior. 
3    RESEARCH MODEL AND PROPOSTIONS 
3.1    Punishment and Behavioral Intention 
Punishment, as one type of formal control mechanisms with mandatoriness, can effectively adjust 
employee`s future behavior to avoid the possible negative consequences. Generally, punishment 
includes verbal reprimands, fines, suspensions, and terminations (Liang et al. 2013). In line with prior 
studies, we take punishment certainty and punishment severity as the components of sanctions in this 
study. We define punishment certainty as employee’s perception of probability to be caught or imposed 
penalties if they engage in omission behaviors. While punishment severity means that employees 
believe they will be severely penalized if they engage in omission behaviors. Punishment will increase 
the physical and/or mental costs, which lead to the withdrawal of positive consequences from 
employees, such as removing privileges, withholding pay raise, or delaying promotions (Liang et al. 
2013). We believe these adverse outcomes will obstruct people`s behavioral decisions making. Thus, 
punishment can effectively inhibit the happen of omission behaviors. We thus hypothesize that: 
Proposition1: Punishment certainty negatively impact on employee`s intention to information security 
omission behavior;  
Proposition 2: Punishment severity negatively impact on employee`s intention to information security 
omission behavior; 
3.2    Social Norms of Misperception and Behavioral Intention 
Prior studies about social norms under information security context have a premise that the social norms 
are defaulted as some unwritten rules in line with organization interests and values (Bulgurcu et al. 
2010; Hu et al. 2012). In practices, not all the people can able to accurately identify these positive social 
norms, and then translate them as their own guidelines, because the misperception caused by gaps 
between employee`s perceptive norms and actual norms is inevitable.  
Pluralistic ignorance is the majority who engage in information security behaviors may incorrectly 
believe they are in minority. In terms of ethical behavior, pluralistic ignorance is suitable to predict how 
inaccurate private perceptions of group norms can lead to an accepted environment of unethical 
behavior (Halbesleben et al. 2005). For example, anti-spyware installing is the behavior organization 
expected to ensure the safety of information assets. However, anti-spyware installing and updating is a 
troublesome business for individual employees, although related training on how to user it and the 
supports for helping them properly install it have been included in SETA programs. Once people find 
their colleagues in twos and threes who do not install anti-spyware because of the inconvenience, they 
may mistakenly believe that only less proportion of colleagues select to install it and the most do the 
opposite. Then they are likely to discount their initial safety practices to cite to the “majority” peers 
behaviors. Thus, information security omission behaviors are diffused. Based on that, we posit that: 
Proposition 3: Pluralistic ignorance positively impact on employee`s intention to information security 
omission behavior; 
False consensus is the minority who engage in omission behaviors incorrectly deem they are in majority. 
This misperception is just the reverse of pluralistic ignorance. The retinal effects in psychology is 
helpful to understand false consensus misperception better. Retinal effects suggests that people will be 
more to notice the features or evens the same or similar with their own from others. We also take anti-
spyware software installing as an example. If people find their colleagues in twos and threes who do 
not install anti-spyware for convenience, it is likely for them to mistakenly view this individual self-
interested behavior as the common criteria for most peers. They immerse themselves in this “normal” 
norms and imitate this omission behaviors. However, they fail to clearly recognize the mainstream of 
policy compliance behaviors in majority. Thus, we posit that: 
Proposition 4: False consensus positively impact on employee`s intention to information security 
omission behavior; 
3.3    Punishment and Social Norms 
The effect of subjective norm on employee`s behavioral intention is largely due to the ability of 
significant referent others to punish noncompliance (Venkatesh & Davis 2000), but the excessive of 
punishment is also easy to cause misperception. In organization, the success of information security 
practices are based on the power of security policies. Punishment is one of the critical contents, which 
impacts on employee`s information security behavior by force. However, the way of “punishment 
intimidation” exists the potential negative impact. Actually, warning to the negative behavior 
continually may give employees hints that more people are engaging in information risk behaviors than 
they thought. Thus, they may deem that so many peers around are acting beyond the accordance of the 
policies, and the risky behaviors may be viewed as the acceptable behavior by majority. Moreover, 
under the misperception norms, these security behaviors which in conformity with the specification 
originally may be replaced to the opposite in a long run, namely causing the risky behaviors. Similar 
view has been discussed in education field, such as study on intervention of Internet addiction. Yet, this 
misperception in information security field has not been sufficiently concerned. Thus, we posit that: 
Proposition 5: Punishment acts as the positive moderator in the relationship between social norms and 
security omission behavior. 
Based on the organization control framework, we integrate social norm theory and deterrence theory to 
construct research model in order to explain and predict organization employee`s intention to 
information security omission behavior. Major factors include punishment certainty, punishment 
severity, pluralistic ignorance, and false consensus. Additionally, intention to information security 
omission behavior is adopted as outcome variable. Besides, we also adopt scenario, gender, age, work 
experience, and the presence of security training as the control variables according to prior studies. The 
research model is shown in figure 1.  
 Figure 1.         Research Model 
4    DISCUSSION AND CONCLSION 
Our work significantly contributions to the information security field by identifying potential 
determinants of employee’s information security omission behavior intention from organizational 
control perspective. We construct research model by integrating deterrence theory and social norm 
theory. And we believe that employee`s omission behavior depends on the interaction of formal control 
and informal control. More in detail, we expect that punishment as one type of formal control 
mechanisms may effectively reduce employee`s omission behaviors, while the misperception of social 
norms as one type of informal control mechanisms are likely to contribute to the diffusion of this 
mission behaviors among employees. Especially, under the context of Chinese collectivism culture, 
people tend to comply with “authorities” or engage in behaviors consistent with the majority in order 
to cite to the benefits of them. Thus, some behaviors are prohibited by ISPs may be stealthily begin to 
circulate in organization. If things go on like this, this ill-formed beliefs may become a default norm. 
Thereby, the gap between this perceptive norm and organization recommended norm may lead to more 
employees involve in misperceptions to take up omission behaviors. More interested, we suspect this 
misperception may lead to the failure of punishment. Because of the misperception, people may deem 
their behaviors in line with most people must be approved by organization. Of course, the premise of 
this conjecture is employees intentional to avoid or ignore policies or the lack of effective SETA 
programs to help employees to regulate employees’ behaviors. Furthermore, further empirical research 
is necessary to validate the conceptual model and propositions. Besides, a useful method or mechanism 
will be designed based on social norm approach in order to intervene the security omission behavior. 
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